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In Being and Time, Heidegger famously
notes that the analysis of the affects (pathe\) has
taken barely one step forward since book II of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric (H139).1
The occasion for this reengagement with
the possibility of a “step forward” is the avail-
ability of Heidegger’s lecture course at the
University of Marburg in 1924 on the Basic
Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. This
course, which includes a detailed analysis of
book II of the Rhetoric, has been published as
volume 18 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe
(2002) and just translated (2009).2 Here
Heidegger’s penetrating but sparse remarks in
Being and Time on Befindl ichkei t
[“affectivity”] are deepened and implemented
in his reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
The relevance of this reengagement is di-
rect. The dominant view of the affects in con-
temporary philosophy is arguably the position
that affects are an unclearly expressed proposi-
tion, including the cognitively articulated
propositional attitude. The position of this es-
say is that the modern propositional account of
the affects is cleared away by and does not sur-
vive a reading of Heidegger’s volume 18 on
book II of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
Lest someone think this is a trivial matter,
the long and distinguished tradition going
back to the Stoics, in which affects are indis-
tinct cognitions that require clarification, is
well articulated in modern times by Anthony
Kenny and then in Martha Nussbaum’s monu-
mental Upheavals of Thought: The Intelli-
gence of Emotions.3
Nussbaum’s position, in particular, is
highly nuanced, and it is an oversimplification
to say that she is merely a cognitivist about the
affects (emotions), pure and simple. One can
get to a cognitivist account in at least two
ways: first, bottom up, by saying that affects
are unclear cognitions (“thoughts”); alterna-
tively, one can redefine the boundary between
affectivity and cognition top down such that
thinking becomes infused with affection—
pardon the expression, more “touchy-feely”—
that is, affects feedback into thought and en-
able the eruptions of thought of the kind that
produce paradigm shifts in science, creativity
in art, and personality transformation in ther-
apy. These eruptions are a function of the
affectivity of thinking. The boundary is trans-
gressed not only from affectivity to cognition,
but in the reverse direction as well, yielding a
quality of thought that is densely suffused with
an emotional tonality such as that exemplified
in musicality. Nevertheless, I shall include
Nussbaum’s contribution as belonging to the
cognitivist approach because, ultimately, even
if she is able to translate partially between the
two, she fights continuously against the
incommensurability of thoughts and affects. In
fact, Heidegger explicitly warns against the
second, top down account—any cognitive de-
termining of Befindlichkeit is confused with
surrendering science ontically to feeling
(H138).
Rhetoric is the art of doing things with
words, even in a performative sense of speak-
ing a world of commitments into existence in
the community (polis), and Heidegger gives
matters a strikingly innovative twist. The hori-
zon of this speaking turns out to be acoustics—
hearing. The work of rhetoric is speaking and
listening to one another about what matters:
“rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in
which the self-interpretation of being-there
[existence] is explicitly fulfilled. Rhetoric is
nothing other than the interpretation of con-
crete being-there [existence], the hermeneutic
of being-there itself” (1924: 76). Aristotle’s
Rhetoric is for those speakers and listeners—
like Heidegger and his audience—whose exis-
tence is an issue for them. The three major dis-
tinctions or pisteis (views) of the Rhetoric are
engaged: character (e\thos), affect (pathos),
and speech (logos). While the pathe\ in which
the world is disclosed as mattering to human
being ultimately cannot be completely articu-
lated and exhausted by e\thos or logos (or
nous), diverse domains of relatedness are
available where our being-with-one-another
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shows up in the speaking and acting in the
polis, where “polis” is used in the broad sense
of engaging with one another as members of
the same human community (1924: 72) of
agents and doers.4
The distinction “Befindlichkeit”—how one
finds oneself situated affectively—does not
occur in volume 18 as an explicit distinction,
but is in the background. But reading the texts
from this volume as modern readers, we can-
not help but bring distinctions such as
Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Auslegung, and
Rede from the existential analytic of Dasein to
our reading. It requires an effort of the imagi-
nation to momentarily quarantine such distinc-
tions, which would only first formally occur
explicitly in Being and Time, to appreciate the
originality, power, and perhaps even shock of
Heidegger’s interpretation as it must have
sounded in 1924 to those hearing his lectures
in the class for the first time. Consider:
These pathe, “affects,” are not states pertaining
to ensouled things, but are concerned with a dis-
position of living things in their world, in the
mode of being positioned towards something,
allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects
play a fundamental role in the determination of
being-in-the-world, of being-with-and-to-
wards-others. (1924: 83)
Affects determine being-in-the-world and
being-with-and-towards-others. Affects show
up as “making a difference,” as “mattering.”
This “making a difference” is what it means
when Heidegger says the Befindlichkeit—his
terminology for the complex of moods, emo-
tions, sensations, passions, and the felt aspects
of existence—is that out of which something
in the world (already) matters to an individ-
ual’s existence (Heidegger 1927: H137–38).5
Individual human existence is not merely or
purely spontaneous. Dasein is not only or al-
ways the cause. Rather, Dasein is also at the ef-
fect of circumstances—and, thus, affected.
Dasein is at the effect of its affects, which dis-
close the world, its situation and Dasein in it.
Affects deliver Dasein over to such contin-
gency—thrownness and the related facticity.
The situation disclosed in affectivity is the
source of what makes the context engage the
individual in such a way that it matters to the
individual. The source of how and why the sit-
uation makes a difference gets disclosed to
Dasein initially in affectivity.
Befindlichkeit emerges from pathe\ in the
broad sense of the way that human existence is
over-taken, seized, overcome, by the world.
Heidegger makes good use of Aristotle’s lan-
guage here:
Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul
hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say
that the human being hopes, is brave. . . . “To say
that the soul gets angry is the same as wanting to
say that the soul builds a house. It would be
better to say not that the soul has pity or learns or
believes something, but that the human being
does te\ psyche\” [De Anima G 4, 408b11 sqq.]....
Therefore, the pathe\ are not “psychic experi-
ences,” are not “in consciousness,” but are a be-
ing-taken of human beings in their full being-
in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that
the whole, the full occurrence-context, which is
found in this happening, in being-taken, belong
to the pathe. The so-called “bodily state” of
anxiety, joy, and so forth, are not symptoms, but
also belong to the characteristic being of beings,
of human beings. (Heidegger 1924: 133)
The text does at least three things. First,
Heidegger’s anti-psychologism in the modern
representational sense is in full evidence.
More on this shortly. Second, the text shows
Heidegger less neglectful of the physical (or-
ganic) body than he is usually regarded. The
“bodily state” in which anxiety (fear) or joy is
expressed in facial features or physical ges-
tures are not symptoms of hidden, underlying
pathe\. They are the very being of the pathe\
themselves—nothing is hidden, though, of
course, not displaying an affect is always a
privative and derivative option. The fear is im-
mediately available and present in the wide
eyes and grimace—the joy in the laughing
eyes and smile. Third, the text provides the
“being taken of human beings in their full be-
ing in the world” as a precursor to
thrownness—the “that it is and has to be.” “Be-
ing taken” is a kind of inside out “thrownness.”
This text yields the full sense of Befindlichkeit
when combined with the above-cited text on
how our affectivity determines (even subordi-
nates) our beliefs and cognitions to the matter-
ing disclosed to Dasein.
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Just as a Befindlichkeit can be articulated in
a diversity of possibilities, interpretations, and
expressions in speech, no one of which is in-
trinsically superior to the other, likewise an af-
fect can be articulated—one might say “trans-
lated”—into a variety of different apophantic
propositions expressing declarative content.
But the translation is incomplete and indeter-
minate. Something escapes. That something is
precisely the way in which the Befindlichkeit
and the affect as a derivative form thereof
make the world matter to us as individual
Dasein. It is the difference between a piece of
information “I am afraid of the snake” and the
immediate reaction, for example, in which a
certain Charles Darwin, visiting the snake
house at the zoo, literally jerked his head back-
wards when the cobra, safely contained behind
the glass, struck directly at him. The pattern is
the same even with those reactions that are not
hard-coded reflexes but rather a function of the
social pretences and colonization of the notori-
ous das Man—the inauthentic but seemingly
inescapable “the one” (the “they self”)—in our
comportment, behavior, and relatedness
(distractedness).
While it is an over-simplification, the three
pisteis (views) of the Rhetoric into e\thos, pa-
thos, and logos, correspond to the interrelated
distinctions of Verstehen, Befindlichkeit, and
Rede in the existential analysis of Being and
Time. The first correlation (e\thos ~ Verstehen)
is perhaps the most controversial association
and arguably the least relevant either to
Heidegger’s thesis in volume 18 or to ours in
this essay. However, one can get a sense of how
well the correlation fits in that e\thos (charac-
ter) is the source of phrone\sis and the “most
decisive positive possibility” that the speaker
has at his disposal (1924: 112). Character is a
“possibility engine” for the speaker, percolat-
ing up significant and relevant insights, to per-
suade and enroll others in a possibility and pro-
ject of implementing the possibility by being
an example of integrity and openness for pos-
sibility. The speaker wins over the audience to
her (or his) belief, not only by logic and a pas-
sionate delivery but, just as significantly, by
who she is as a possibility, exemplifying integ-
rity and trustworthiness of character.
Turning to the pathe \, according to
Heidegger, the analysis at the level of Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric requires that the pathe\ have,
beyond the concrete being of human beings, a
characteristic way of being that could be gath-
ered into the logos and articulated in speech
(135). This is the crucial passage (and argu-
ment) for the thesis of this essay that the cogni-
tive (propositional attitude) approach to the af-
fects is incomplete, that something essential
escapes. In the following passage, the nous is
“more than human being can be” and escapes
upward and the pathos is (so to speak) simulta-
neously pulled downward by its hyle\ (mate-
rial). Consider:
As such, nous is apathes [De an. G 4, 429a15],
“that which nothing can touch.” . . . Thus nous,
in relation to the being-opened-up of being-in,
is more than the human being can be since the
way that the human being takes up this possibil-
ity, nous, is dianoeisthai. Insofar as nous consti-
tutes the being-opened-up of the human being,
it is a dia, insofar as living is determined by lupe\
and hedone [pain and pleasure as the marks of
pathe], nous is the basic condition of the possi-
bility of being-in-the-world, which as such
stands out behind the particular concrete being
of individual human beings. (1924: 135)
The nous is a-pathe\s. It is incommensura-
ble with the pathe\tika—against thinking
(dianoeisthai). Nous is untouchable — “that
which nothing can touch” —in a way that ordi-
nary human existence is constantly touched by
particular affects and the totality of a world
that matters affectively. In this context, nous
maps to understanding as the locus of possibil-
ity and pathe\ to Befindlichkeit with its back-
ground marks of pain and pleasure [lupe\ and
hedone] in the openness where human exis-
tence is situated. Heidegger and Aristotle drive
nous back in the direction of pathe\:
Book 1, Chapter 1 of De Anima investigates the
extent to which nous, as a basic determination
of the being of human beings, is a basic charac-
teristic of this way of being; and the extent to
which the human being only constitutes a defi-
nite possibility of the being of nous. . . . This
universality of the possibility of grasping [in
nous] is something that is not to be equated with
the concrete being of the human being, which is
always at the moment. What grounds this possi-
bility of grasping everything, which grows out
beyond the human being and its concrete being?
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. . . Aristotle discusses the pathe\ as those phe-
nomena in which it is shown that the concrete
being of human beings can only be understood
if one takes it in its fullness. . . . It is, above all,
decisive that we lose our composure, as in the
case of fearing without encountering something
in the environing world that could be the direct
occasion of fear. (1924: 139–40)
In particular, the example in the last sen-
tence points to the understanding of affects as
disclosive of a whole way of being-in-the-
world, not just particular things. We are dis-
comforted or de-composed in fear without a
particular fearful thing being encountered.
This indicates a disclosure of Dasein’s being-
in-the-world as a totality that is at stake. How-
ever, Heidegger does not yet call out the para-
digm of being-towards-death (as he will a few
years later). Instead, following a close reading
of Aristotle, Heidegger gives a short account
of an example in terms of the Aristotelian four
causes. The physician sees anger as a boiling
up of blood in the heart and of the bodily tem-
perature – an early version of the hard-wiring
of our biology to its expression in a somatic-fa-
cial program; the rhetorician, going decisively
beyond psychological representations, sees
anger formally as seeking pay-back, an impla-
cability towards others; the cause as final pur-
pose (or “target”) is an individual, group, or
idea that matters to human existence and at
which one takes aim; and, finally, anger has
certain immediate causes, which act as trig-
gers, such as insults, slights, disdain, the
imagined or actual dishonoring of people and
their cherished ambitions, goals, and ideals.
This analysis maps closely to that provided
by Heidegger in §30 of Being and Time, “Fear
as a Mode of Affectivity” (H 140–42). Closely,
but not identically, since the material cause
drops out of both the Rhetoric and §30, and is
only completed in the 1924 lectures by refer-
ences to De Anima. Thus, that in the face of
which we fear, the fearsome,6 is encountered
within the world as a trigger that has danger
(“dangerous objects”) as its context of involve-
ments. The engaging thing is that, even as the
fearsome comes at Dasein out of the world,
like a charging lion or run-away Toyota,
Dasein’s fear is fundamentally a function of
the possibility that the danger will pass by and
miss Dasein, thus revealing the temporal as-
pect (ekstasis) of futurity even at the heart of
contingency and thrownness based out of the
past. Next, the formal definition of fearfulness,
fearing as such [Furchtsamkeit], is a possibil-
ity that is already disclosed in the world as
something that is freed into the clearing that
Dasein opens up and there comes to matter to
Dasein as threatening. Finally, that about
which Dasein fears is Dasein itself. All
roads—and fears—lead to Dasein; and Dasein
is inevitably the about which (woran) of fear.
Even if a person is afraid of an expensive repair
of the leaking roof of his house, the fear is that
Dasein lacks proper shelter and will be ex-
posed to the storm. Thus, section §30 and its
resonance with the 1924 lectures is a strong re-
minder that Heidegger provides a robust ac-
count of the emotions in all their everyday
complexity and richness. The existentialist
reading that focuses only on the mood of anxi-
ety in the face of death misses the nearly seam-
less continuity with the work of the early
Heidegger as it is carried forward from the rich
and diverse details of Aristotle’s Rhetoric into
Being and Time (granted that such material
was not necessarily available to the initial
existentialist reading).
While the logos emerges from the pathe\ and
the two are inextricability required to complete
one another, the relationship is not reductive,
unidirectional, or even complete in the sense
that there is no conflict or struggle. Conflict
and incompleteness are a part of the expression
of pathe\ by logos and the feedback of logos
into pathe\. At the level of the 1924 text, this es-
tablishes the incommensurability of pathe\ and
nous—in our interpretation—the incomplete-
ness of articulating pathe\ as cognitions (prop-
ositional attitudes). If further textual evidence
is required, the inexhaustibility of the pathe\ by
the logos extends beyond knowing in the fol-
lowing:
We still have to come to an understanding in
what follows as to how fear and the pathe\ stand
in connection with logos. . . . Insofar as the
pathe\ are not merely an annex of psychical pro-
cesses, but are rather the ground out of which
speaking arises, and which what is expressed
grows back into, the pathe, for their part, are the
basic possibilities in which being-there itself is
primarily oriented toward itself, finds itself.
The primary being-oriented, the illumination of
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its being-in-the-world is not a knowing, but
rather a finding oneself that can be determined
differently, according to the mode of being-
there of a being. (1924: 176; italics deleted from
the original for readability)
The being-oriented and being-in-the-world
of pathe\ are “not a knowing.” However, the
pathe\ are a source of different possible under-
standings and interpretations that can, in turn,
be articulated in the logos. In a sense, this gives
indirect, limited comfort to the cognitivist ap-
proach to the affects, since it acknowledges the
continuity and indispensability of logos and
pathe\ (and nous); and yet it indicates the
inexhaustibility of pathe\ as a source of further
distinctions for being-in-the-world.
If one wishes to rise above the level of
Heidegger’s textual interpretation of the Rhet-
oric, no matter how innovative, and, using
Heidegger’s 1924 text as a springboard, mar-
shal additional arguments against the cog-
nitivist approach to the affects, one does not
need to look far. Phenomena such as emotional
ambivalence and the cognitive impenetrability
of affects provide counter-examples to the
cognitivist paradigm.
The cognitivist (“propositional attitude”)
approach to affects is shown to have a counter-
example by Pat Greenspan (1980). 7 She fo-
cuses on emotions as opposed to affects or
moods, but much of what she argues applies
generally. Her counter-example extends at
least to the assertion that the emotions are logi-
cal in any ordinary interpretation of the princi-
ple of contradiction. The example of ambiva-
lence where an individual holds two contrary
or even contradictory emotions about a single
event, outcome, individual, or situation sug-
gests that mixed emotions do not behave as
propositions in any ordinary way. Greenspan
succeeds in establishing that it is really about
one and the same individual that we simulta-
neously and with respect to the same property
experience satisfaction and frustration, happi-
ness and unhappiness, hope and fear—as
when, speaking in the first person for empha-
sis, a friend receives a promotion that I had my-
self hoped to receive. For this penetrating anal-
ysis, we are grateful (and without mixed
feelings). Emotional ambivalence is com-
mon—love and hate, hope and fear, joy and
sorrow. We have no trouble authentically en-
tertaining mixed emotions. Welcome to the
real world—it happens often. We are thrown
into ambivalence, and these mixed feelings
come at us humans as a function of our contin-
gency and thrownness. How this is reconcil-
able with the rationality of the emotions re-
quires further argument and modifies our
conception of rationality in interesting ways,
according to Greenspan.8
The Aristotelian answer here is that ratio-
nality is a task, a work-in-progress that re-
quires our being-with-one-another in the en-
gaged speaking and acting of the polis in order
to implement a community in which humans
flourish, at least for those who Aristotle has de-
fined as belonging to the “in group.” The
Heideggerian answer is that Befindlichkeit
readily encompasses ambivalence, and is not
propositionally analyzable “all the way
down.” For Heidegger, the possibilities of our
Befindlichkeit are inexhaustible, for whenever
one possibility is implemented on the thrown
basis of our nullity, other possibilities are nec-
essarily passed over and fade back into the
background of dispositions and latent abilities.
If further example is needed that the affects
cannot be completely articulated in proposi-
tional attitudes of belief and desire, then the
evidence that affects are impervious to beliefs
is useful. Zenon Pylyshyn is credited with
coining the term “cognitive impenetrability,”
with specific reference to visual perception;
but the applications extend beyond the compu-
tational context of information processing in
the visual system to affectivity, belief, and de-
sire at large.9 The evidence that the individual
is not really dealing with a belief (a candidate
for cognitive verification) is that the individual
still feels there is something uncanny and un-
comfortable about that snake, even though it is
rubber. The complex “Fear—snake—danger”
does indeed contain a belief component, and it
is one that becomes accessible and visible as
the affective complex gets translated from the
undifferentiated Befindlichkeit of being-in-
the-world into the derivative, de-worlded, cor-
responding cognitive system. Yet the rubber
snake still gives the individual an uncanny
feeling. What does not get translated is the is-
sue why it should matter. The snake becomes a
reminder that Dasein is an individual being
whose being is an issue for itself. Nothing is
lost in the translation—nothing except the af-
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fect itself. In another example, I know that fly-
ing on a commercial airplane is much safer
than getting behind the wheel of a car. Yet as I
sit back in my airplane seat (let’s say) I am still
intermittently fearful, my palms get sweaty as
the plane is taxiing toward the runway, and I
experience a dryness in my mouth (i.e., fear)
that I never experience in getting behind the
wheel of a car. And I know which is safer—fly-
ing. Examples where true belief or knowledge
does not make a difference to one’s affects are
common. Darwin knew the cobra was safely
locked away behind the plate glass in the zoo.
Yet he immediately jumped back when the
snake struck. Of course, this is a reflex-like re-
action; and it would go too far to assert that
affects are mere reflexes. They are much
richer. Yet they share a reflex-like function in
that they are impervious to what the individual
knows (believes).
It goes beyond the level of Heidegger’s (or
Aristotle’s text) to complete the analysis of
these examples. Yet we can marshal distinc-
tions from these thinkers to do so. In the case of
some fears such as snakes and the affect of dis-
gust, we may actually be dealing with a hard-
coded response.10 Evolution and natural selec-
tion hands down such responses to our contin-
gent thrownness of a being-in-the-world of the
ancient environment of evolutionary adapta-
tion on the savannah plains of east Africa. We
are embodied creatures and we have to bring
forward our facticity and transform it as best
we can. In the case of fear of flying, what is dis-
closed in the coach section of an airplane
(among other things) is a world in which the
passenger has limited personal space, no
choice, and no control. One need not be a psy-
chiatric case to find that such an extreme loss
of control is threatening to the integrity of
one’s existence or to discover a pattern of
threat activation that is impervious to (many)
rational beliefs and arguments. As noted
above, what does not get translated cognitively
is the issue why it should matter. The fear of
flying becomes a reminder that Dasein is an in-
dividual being whose being is an issue for it-
self. Once again, nothing is lost in the
translation—nothing except the mattering, the
affect itself.
The proponent of the cognitive, proposi-
tional attitude cannot escape by saying this is a
special case. The incommensurability of logos
(and nous) to pathe\ applies across all the ma-
jor distinctions of pathe \—hard-coded,
affective responses (“gut reactions”), social
pretences, eruptive emotions, moods—
whether inauthentic or authentic, and includ-
ing cognitive impenetrability. This is a rich
area for additional research. Let us engage in
some as inspired by Heidegger’s lecture and
related distinctions.
(1) Pathe\ are candidate instances of “social
pretences” built around roles in human rela-
tions at the level of the inauthentic das Man
(the “they self”). In social pretences such as ro-
mantic love, the rebel without a cause, or a
woman scorned, Dasein takes over its affect
from its everyday way of being with other indi-
viduals in superficial community under the
colonization of das Man.11 Heidegger’s
1924 lectures undertake what can best be de-
scribed as a tour de force interpretation of Ar-
istotle, enumerating nine different ways in
which a human being encounters others as
frightening (1924: 172; Rhetoric 1382b). I
suggest that every one of them, without excep-
tion, is inauthentic. In each case, the other is
implicated as the source of fear, and without
the other, the pathe\would not be; yet the fear is
due to something lacking in integrity, under-
handed, or deceptive.
In each case, a social pretence takes center
stage (Rhetoric [1924: 172; Rhetoric 1382]).
(i) Those who are literally partners in crime are
afraid of one another. Those who commit a
crime together expect to be compromised by
the other’s lack of trust. The supposed pretence
of honor among thieves gives way to simple
distrust and direct betrayal. (ii) When a power-
ful individual is unjust, this is a source of fear,
since he has the power to inflict pain on one.
The tyrant often pretends to catch someone in a
lie or inconsistency before the individual vic-
tim “disappears” or is publicly crushed in a
show trial. (iii) Those that have been injured
are expected to lash out in return at those be-
lieved to have caused them injury. The pre-
tence is that two wrongs make a right. (iv)
Those who know they have injured another (as
in the previous item (iii)) and are anticipating a
reprisal are made even more dangerous in a
fearful spiral of tit-for-tat. Again, two wrongs
do not make a right, but spawn an entire series
of fear-inducing wrongs. (v) Individuals com-
peting for the same stakes in a situation of scar-
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city—in what we would today call a “zero sum
game”—are afraid of one another. The pre-
tence is that there really is not enough to go
around, even if the scarcity has been artifi-
cially manufactured, thereby generating even
more fear. (vi) Those that have nothing to lose
and so lose all fear themselves are in an power-
ful position to inspire fear in others precisely
since they have no hope of escaping distress,
but are able to inflict it. (vii) Those that, thanks
to superior position or power, have already
caused an injury to an inferior are feared as be-
ing able to do so again. The pretence on the
part of the inferior individual is that one is im-
portant or significant enough to be worth the
further injury or, on the part of the superior
one, that he cares enough to do so. (viii) The
weak are to be feared in so far as, if they are out
to ruin an individual, and hiding their intention
stealthily, then they may prepare a surprise at-
tack that they will one day launch. The pre-
tence is that the weak are interested in starting
a fight with the stronger. (ix) Enemies who
wear their heart on their sleeves are not be
feared, since they are open; but those who are
sly, deceptive, or reserved and pretend to be
one’s friend are to be feared. The pretence is
that of a “smiling face that pretends to be your
friend.”
Other modern examples of pathe\ as social
pretences include forms of infatuation and ro-
mantic love. The idealization of one another
by star-crossed young lovers such as Romeo
and Juliet is not based on a healthy process of
getting to know one another, albeit deeply
moving as a narrative in spite of that. Neither is
Juliet as wonderful as Romeo imagined, nor
Romeo as magnificent as Juliet idealized him
to be. If their tragic story had not taken the dra-
matic turn it did in Shakespeare, Juliet would
soon be tired of picking up Romeo’s dirty
socks upon his return from a hard day at court;
and Romeo would be tired of Juliet’s nagging
about her in-laws. In another example, in the
pre-ontological folktale, nothing is more cer-
tain than that after the injunction “you may
open every door in the castle, but do not open
that one” the hero or heroine will immediately
do so; likewise, with Romeo and Juliet taking a
romantic interest in one another. An irresist-
ible attraction immediately followed upon the
prohibition of contact and communication.
The social pretences of Twelve Angry Men
and Rebel without a Cause—in the movies of
the same titles—are taken over from our con-
ventional understandings of possibilities as re-
ferred to by das Man. Here the translation from
pathe\ to logos fails, not because the meaning
is so deep and significant, but rather because it
is so superficial and ambiguous. The rebel
without a cause is the owner of a free floating
narcissistic rage in search of a target on which
to lock in order to bring to expression (and
completion) a personal indignation that had
nothing to do with the target either necessarily
or even contingently. Other examples of social
pretences include the shame of a woman
scorned, wearing Hester Prynne’s scarlet let-
ter, in Hawthorne’s novel of the same.12
Let consider one example in detail. The
twelve angry men—actually it was eleven
since one of them kept his wits about him—
were angry about rising urban crime in the
context of the 1950s in the USA, based on a
stereotype of switch-blade wielding Hispanic
street gangs; and, thus biased, were about to
convict an innocent defendant of murder. All
but one of them “knew” that the accused was
guilty. The accused fit the stereotype. He fit the
social role. He fit the profile of the pretence
provided by conventional wisdom of das Man,
though Heidegger’s distinction obviously does
not occur in the film. Thus eleven of the twelve
jurors themselves fit their own profile of men
angry about urban decay and the misbehavior
of the anonymous stereotype. The circumstan-
tial evidence was compelling. Only one indi-
vidual suspected (“knew”) that he did not
know. This opened up a possibility not envi-
sioned in the social pretences governing the
conversation in the court, in this case not only
with the accused and with his fellow jurors, but
with gang members’ actual practices in using
switch-blade knives. Based on the one, lone,
holdout juror’s interpretation of the distinction
between stabbing upwards versus downwards
with the switch blade—he was able to articu-
late authentically what was possible to his fel-
low jurors, namely, that the accused was
falsely accused and indeed innocent. The
anger vanishes in a puff of instrumental
practice as the jurors acknowledge a near fatal
misinterpretation.
(2) Next, let us consider pathe\ as what are
(in effect) hard-coded somatic patterns, for ex-
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ample, to laugh when tickled, to cry when
deeply disappointed by loss, to take flight
when outnumbered by hostile forces, or lash
out indignantly when insulted. Even though
we humans are able to interrupt these immedi-
ate reactions that overtake us, and, thus inter-
vening with deliberation, are able to recapture
our freedom in at least some instances, still
such patterns point to Dasein’s contingent
thrownness (embodiment) in Heideggerian
terms and hyle\—material cause—in Aristote-
lian terms. It is possible that Heidegger would
be dismissive of the results of the scientific dis-
covery of mirror neurons and the social neuro-
science opened up by fMRI research. Yet an al-
ternative reading is that he leaves a place for
the results of scientific research, albeit as a de-
rivative form of being-in-the-world, knowl-
edge.13
The short version of such research is that the
same areas of the brain relevant to pain are acti-
vated in observing an individual experience
pain as are activated by the individual’s di-
rectly experiencing the painful stimulus. This
is worth repeating – the one observing and the
one experiencing pain show the same areas of
the brain are activated, albeit with less inten-
sity on the part of the observer. No one is say-
ing that such neuronal activity provides a gen-
eral law of causation between mind and body.
It remains the case that correlation is not cau-
sation. Rather an implementation mechanism
subserving a communicability of affect be-
tween human beings in the world is suggested.
Thus, those philosophers are stopped short,
who, for example, propose a thought
(Gedanken) experiment in which two individ-
ual subjects are imaginatively linked at the
level of their physiologies via a radio transmit-
ter after having been artificially de-worlded.
We no longer need to imagine such a thought
experiment. The mirror neuron system (MNS)
and fMRI studies provide all the access re-
quired to disclose the affective resonance of
two individuals at the level of emotional conta-
gion, vicarious experience, or synchronized
behaviors such as contagious yawning. Our
co-Befindlichkeit extends further downwards
into the somatic infrastructure, though obvi-
ously without individual awareness of it, than
was previously thought to be the case. How
such contingencies are further elaborated for
possibilities of human understanding is an
open question not addressed at the level of
thrownness or Aristotle’s material cause.
While fundamental ontology does not wait
for the scientific results of neurology to make a
contribution, and while the results of empirical
science remain empirically valid and subject to
refinement, revision, or even refutation, we
should not be too surprised to learn that co-
Befindlichkeit, Mitsein, and Mitdasein have an
implementation mechanism that is identified
at the level of neurology. What is surprising is
that the neuronal mechanism should be so rela-
tively simple. Instead of a neural network of
amazing complexity and a causal thicket of se-
mantic opacity, a granular one-to-one map-
ping between the mirror neuron systems of two
individuals is functioning to produce the re-
sults. The Cartesian myth that humans are un-
related cogitos was debunked by Heidegger as
part of his original contribution. The surpris-
ing thing is that a neurological correlate to
such debunking has surfaced. We are related,
even at the physiological level. Whether such
an account will survive the onslaught of fur-
ther properly skeptical scientific inquiry is a
valid (and open) question. However, the rec-
ommendation to Heidegger scholars, at least
for the time being, is to enjoy a moment of sci-
entific satisfaction.
(3) Finally, pathe\ provide the basis of au-
thentic commitments. Of course, Heidegger
gives the classic, existential example of this as
the mood of anxiety in the individualizing con-
frontation with death.14 Human existence uses
this confrontation with death as disclosed in
anxiety to shatter the complacency and dis-
traction of the domination of the everyday—
das Man—and engages in an authentic choice
and commitment. In this example, human exis-
tence is individualized down to its ownmost
potentiality and is alone—no one can die
Dasein’s death for it. Dasein is authentic—and
all alone. Yet there are examples of pathe\ that
disclose Dasein in relation to other individuals
and do so authentically.
We must guard against a misunderstanding
here. It is not that any given set of pathe\ are in-
trinsically authentic or inauthentic. For exam-
ple, it is not that fear is inauthentic and anxiety
authentic. It is true that Heidegger privileges
the mood of anxiety in the face of death as
disclosive of Dasein as whole and as an indi-
vidualized self subsequently capable of au-
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thentic projects and commitments. Yet it is
easy to think of examples of inauthentic anxi-
ety. The caricature of existentialism in which
anxiety paralyzes the existential hero, who is
unable to choose, is one example. Next, the vi-
carious anxiety created in the theatre during
scenes of suspense, anticipation, or high ex-
pectation, provides another instance. Finally,
the free floating anxiety of classical neurosis
that emerges in phobias, paranoia, and obses-
sive compulsive rituals (or, more exactly, the
prohibition of such rituals) also come to mind.
In every case, the anxiety is arguably in-
authentic because the individual is engaged at
at a level distinct from an anticipatory reso-
luteness that makes a difference to Dasein’s
life commitments or at a level in which Dasein
engages in self-deception. We saw nine exam-
ples of inauthentic fear. Yet authentic fear is
that which is experienced in choosing to go
forward into danger in spite of feeling afraid.
Of course, the warrior in battle who knows that
he is at risk and feels afraid yet advances any-
way is a paradigm case here. But not only war-
riors. The individual who stands at the end of
the street where he lives and sees a tornado
bearing down on him knows at that moment
authentic fear and is strongly motivated to run
and take cover. Likewise, anyone who has to
speak truth to power—for example, Mandela,
Gandhi, or King—and does so, not recklessly,
but with deliberation and commitment to the
cause (fairness, liberation, equality, and so on)
experiences authentic fear. It does not deter-
mine the action. It does not stop the speaker.
But it is there, at least initially.
All of the pathe\ are capable of being re-
cruited as inauthentic social pretences or, al-
ternatively, as the authentic basis of commit-
ments including commitments to others. In
parallel with and contrast to social pretences,
there are certain pathe\ that are possible only in
authentic interrelation with another individ-
ual, which loom large in Heidegger’s analysis
of the Rhetoric. Arguably, Heidegger might
have usefully brought forward one or more ex-
amples of pathe\ that disclose an other Dasein
instead of putting all his analytic eggs in the
single basket of anticipatory resolutions to-
wards death as disclosed in anxiety, resulting
in a Dasein that is indeed authentic but seem-
ingly always alone.15
While fear reveals threatening objects (in-
cluding other individuals) and anxiety dis-
closes the totality of Dasein, there are pathe\
that disclose another Dasein—Dasein as the
other individual. Almost without exception,
Aristotle’s discussion of diverse pathe\ pro-
vides examples of the disclosure of others.
There are entire groups of affects, both
inauthentic and authentic, that Heidegger un-
covers thanks to Aristotle’s work in book II of
the Rhetoric which Dasein cannot experience
without the availability of the other individ-
ual.16 Many affects such as righteous indigna-
tion—at which we are about to look—or guilt,
shame, jealousy, and so on—make a social ref-
erence to the other who is essential for the
emergence and functioning of the affect in
question.
A wonderful example of the Befindlichkeit
of righteous indignation, essentially a social
reference and response to the conduct of the
other person (or group), is disclosed in the lab-
oratory by R. H. Frank in the Ultimatum Game
(UG).17 I hasten to add that Heidegger’s dis-
tinctions are not ones used by Frank, but, as we
shall see, bringing them to Frank’s work with
the passions is illuminating. In the UG, one
player is given a set amount of money—say
twenty dollars. He is then required to hand
over, at his own discretion, a portion of the
money to a second player. If the second player
declines the offer, then both players get zero;
otherwise, they get to keep the cash according
to the proposed offer. From a rational point of
view, where rationality is defined in terms of
narrow self-interest, if player #1 offers one out
of twenty dollars, then player #2 would still be
better off taking it, since one dollar is more
than zero dollars, which is what #2 had at the
start. However, that is not what happens in the
real world. Such “low ball” offers by player
#1 are overwhelmingly refused by player #2.
The second player forfeits his own narrow self-
interest. Of course, the questions are: Why?
What does it mean?
The standard interpretation is that the offer
indicated above is grossly unfair. The individ-
ual is dishonored by the offer, even insulted by
the lack of respect displayed in such a pre-
sumptuous proposal. This leads to righteous
indignation (a particularly nuanced form of
anger) and the punishing (sanctioning) of oth-
ers’ unfair behavior, a sanction that also has a
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negative consequence for player #2, though
not as great a loss for #1 (who loses $19) while
#2 only loses $1.
The less standard interpretation, though
consistent with the above-cited intuition on ba-
sic fairness, is that this conclusion is the result
of a process of reasoning that is akin to Aris-
totle’s phrone\sis, deliberation about what is
good for the human being in context, rather
than a rationally mathematical optimization.
To deploy the distinctions of the Rhetoric, the
logos is the mathematical calculation that ar-
ticulates the explicit judgment that one dollar
is more than nineteen. Duly noted. The pathos
is the disclosure of righteous indignation
based on the possibility—conspicuous by its
absence—of a division of the assets that treats
each participant with respect and gives each a
mutually satisfying share of the proceeds. The
e\thos is the intelligibility of the situation—in-
tegrity in a broad sense of workability (not
necessarily one that blames or praises) that as-
signs one individual the function of division
and the other that of approval of the division.
The proposed division of one part of twenty
does show a certain character—or more pre-
cisely lack thereof—and one that, in most
cases, arouses the response of righteous indig-
nation.
If one would like to discover a paradigm
context disclosive of righteous indignation,
this is what it looks like—being asked to agree
to get one dollar while the other gets nineteen.
Both parties have some power—the one to pro-
pose a distribution, the other to veto it. Now
bargain!
Keeping in mind our earlier discussion of
the proposition approach to affects (pathe\), the
situation is rich in propositional content. Yet
the message is delivered as a decision, “Deal!”
or “No deal!” based on the pathe\ that emerges
from social reference to the other in interrela-
tion. Yes, the pathe\ gets translated into some
propositional content, but the latter does not
exhaust the nuances of the interrelational con-
text and why it matters. The latter also moti-
vates the decision, the commitment, and it is
the mattering that discloses how the situation
engages the participants, not cognitively but
affectively as beings-in-the-world to whom
things matter. The individual who proposes a
losing division of one dollar to nineteen not
only gets the propositional content “No
deal!”—the individual also gets no money.
And it is this latter case where the rubber of
righteous indignation meets the road of mutual
respect.
One thing is clearly demonstrated, based on
experience. Players in the underdog position
overwhelming refuse such low offers. When
asked why, they say the offers are “unfair,”
“disrespectful,” even “dishonoring.” In a
broader sense, of course, we start to get the
idea that a broad sense of rational self-interest
does extend to being treated fairly, not just in
the long run, but in individual instances.
What is clear is that when an individual ex-
periences (whether expressed or not) righteous
indignation at a dishonored agreement, broken
promise, or unfair proposal, the affects are be-
ing recruited to sustain the social reference and
relatedness of an authentic commitment to
treat other individuals or groups with honor
and respect. The eruptive affect of righteous
indignation supports the commitment of a fair
distribution, and, in other scenarios, this af-
fects supports people keeping their agree-
ments—at the cost and impact of everyone get-
ting less. An entire class of affects requiring
social referencing to others, such as shame and
guilt and including moral sentiments, contrib-
utes to solving the problem of how creatures of
limited generosity and strong self-interest can
reasonably adhere to commitments. In this
case, the holder of the dollars does not want to
be the target of righteous indignation and is
incented to make a division with reard to the
$20 that captures at least a semblance of
equity, enabling both parties to feel they are
better off.
Thus, pathe\ such as righteous indignation,
guilt, shame, or jealousy do not seem like
transformations of simple anger or fear, on the
one hand, or love, on the other. That is because
they are not. The last two groupings—social
pretenses and irruptive reactions—include
pathe\ that we cannot experience alone. We can
only experience them with the participation
and involvement of other individuals. They are
interrelational as such. Other than that, there is
nothing—no feature or function—that these
divergent pathe\ have in common—not the af-
fective content (feeling), not the behavior, or if
one looks “under the hood”, not the neurology
or endocrinology; not the source or target; nor
the object or cause. Note that these are real
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pathe\. It is just that the category of pathe\ en-
compasses complex and diverging phenom-
ena.
If one begins to suspect that Aristotle’s
pathe\ are an ad hoc grouping, albeit based on
Aristotle’s customary comprehension and
rigor, and assembled together for the benefit of
training the speaker in rhetoric, one should be
also able to find examples of all of the distinc-
tions that fall into each of the diverging catego-
ries—hard-coded response, social pretense,
irruptive reaction, and mood. That is indeed
the case. Completely varying examples of an-
ger will display distinct aspects corresponding
to each of the four distinct groups. For exam-
ple, anger is a response to automobile driver A
cutting off driver B in heavy rush hour traffic
on the commute home. Anger is a social pre-
tence as in the suburban person angered at the
rising crime rate in inner city neighborhoods
where he does not live. Anger is righteous in-
dignation as one reads that human rights activ-
ist Aung San Suu Kyi is still under house arrest
in Myanmar. Finally, anger shows up as a sim-
mering and slow burn of a pervasive mood that
results in a calculated payback, as a person is
passed over for a promotion that she feels she
deserves, secretly applies for and accepts a job
elsewhere, quitting her current position on
short notice. Sadness is a basic response to a
lost puppy. Sadness is a social pretense as in
mourning for a significant other in one’s life
with whom one has had little contact and a dif-
ficult relationship. Sadness is an irruptive re-
action as when a father is disappointed—and
saddened by—the behavior of his teenage son,
who, for example, was caught drinking irre-
sponsibly, watering down the vodka to replace
that which he had consumed. Sadness will be a
pervasive mood, as when contemplating the
autumn of life and how short it is. In every
case, each of the pathe\ is valid in itself, but
does not necessarily have a common feeling
that extends across the instances, nor a specific
set of behaviors that are required. The hard-
coded response and irruptive reaction are hard
to fake, especially if one looks at micro expres-
sions of facial muscles and considers the costs
to both parties. Social pretence often lacks
feeling or constant feeling. The mood lacks
corresponding behavior, though the feeling is
relatively deep and rich. How this maps to
Heidegger’s distinction of Befindlichkeit is in-
dicated at the level of the text above (§30 of
Being and Time, “Fear as a Mode of
Affectivity” [H 140–42]) as the way the world
is disclosed to Dasein.
There is a final pathe\ in which the other
Dasein is disclosed that also goes beyond that
articulated in Heidegger’s work on Aristotle.
For this, of course, Heidegger eventually
turned to Kant. It proposes a paradigm of
affectivity toward the other which Heidegger
explicitly refers to as “respect” [Achtung] in
his Kant book with regard to authentic being-
as-self (1929: 165; also coincidently in §30).18
For Heidegger, human interrelations have an
irreducible dimension of integrity as whole-
ness, not in the narrow sense of judging and
evaluating the other’s behavior in its minute
moral idiosyncrasies and ethical peculiarities,
but in the sense of a practice that determines
the experience of respect towards others that
leaves the other whole and in integrity, ab-
stracting from all the contingent circum-
stances, the conflicts of interest and self-inter-
ests that shape and bias a person’s perceptions,
inclinations, and judgments.
The idea that every experience of the other
has at its kernel a nucleus of respect for the
other leads to a (dis)interested openness to
what is occurring, leaving the other complete
and whole in the other’s own experience of
possibilities. The other is left with the aware-
ness that he or she is not alone but free to create
and express possibilities and make commit-
ments no matter how limiting one’s facticity
(thrownness) may seem to be in the moment.
The mood of respect is a paradigm here, which
does not necessarily mean an awareness of the
moral law (as it would in Kant or even
Scheler); rather it means a clearing for the
other to create possibilities. (Of course, an eth-
ics of Mitdasein has subsequently been de-
rived.19) It means a clearing for care, in the
strict Heideggerian sense, in which care in-
cludes the other in a being-with that is recep-
tive to the other as whole and existing in what’s
possible for Dasein in the full sense of an au-
thentic interrelation of committed speakers
and listeners in community.20
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